507d5d8ef9
------------------------------------------------------------------------ r323155 | chandlerc | 2018-01-22 14:05:25 -0800 (Mon, 22 Jan 2018) | 133 lines Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre.. Summary: First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post for details: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain. The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers. However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86. Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address. On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address. This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them. These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_r11 ``` or on 32-bit: ``` __llvm_external_retpoline_eax __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx __llvm_external_retpoline_edx __llvm_external_retpoline_push ``` And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl` instruction. There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection. The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for retpoline-ed configurations for completeness. For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all* libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller. When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance sensitive paths of the kernel. When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%. However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline. We will add detailed documentation covering these components in subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors. This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design. Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ llvm-svn: 324007
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
Common register allocation / spilling problem:
mul lr, r4, lr
str lr, [sp, #+52]
ldr lr, [r1, #+32]
sxth r3, r3
ldr r4, [sp, #+52]
mla r4, r3, lr, r4
can be:
mul lr, r4, lr
mov r4, lr
str lr, [sp, #+52]
ldr lr, [r1, #+32]
sxth r3, r3
mla r4, r3, lr, r4
and then "merge" mul and mov:
mul r4, r4, lr
str r4, [sp, #+52]
ldr lr, [r1, #+32]
sxth r3, r3
mla r4, r3, lr, r4
It also increase the likelihood the store may become dead.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
bb27 ...
...
%reg1037 = ADDri %reg1039, 1
%reg1038 = ADDrs %reg1032, %reg1039, %NOREG, 10
Successors according to CFG: 0x8b03bf0 (#5)
bb76 (0x8b03bf0, LLVM BB @0x8b032d0, ID#5):
Predecessors according to CFG: 0x8b0c5f0 (#3) 0x8b0a7c0 (#4)
%reg1039 = PHI %reg1070, mbb<bb76.outer,0x8b0c5f0>, %reg1037, mbb<bb27,0x8b0a7c0>
Note ADDri is not a two-address instruction. However, its result %reg1037 is an
operand of the PHI node in bb76 and its operand %reg1039 is the result of the
PHI node. We should treat it as a two-address code and make sure the ADDri is
scheduled after any node that reads %reg1039.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
Use local info (i.e. register scavenger) to assign it a free register to allow
reuse:
ldr r3, [sp, #+4]
add r3, r3, #3
ldr r2, [sp, #+8]
add r2, r2, #2
ldr r1, [sp, #+4] <==
add r1, r1, #1
ldr r0, [sp, #+4]
add r0, r0, #2
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
LLVM aggressively lift CSE out of loop. Sometimes this can be negative side-
effects:
R1 = X + 4
R2 = X + 7
R3 = X + 15
loop:
load [i + R1]
...
load [i + R2]
...
load [i + R3]
Suppose there is high register pressure, R1, R2, R3, can be spilled. We need
to implement proper re-materialization to handle this:
R1 = X + 4
R2 = X + 7
R3 = X + 15
loop:
R1 = X + 4 @ re-materialized
load [i + R1]
...
R2 = X + 7 @ re-materialized
load [i + R2]
...
R3 = X + 15 @ re-materialized
load [i + R3]
Furthermore, with re-association, we can enable sharing:
R1 = X + 4
R2 = X + 7
R3 = X + 15
loop:
T = i + X
load [T + 4]
...
load [T + 7]
...
load [T + 15]
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
It's not always a good idea to choose rematerialization over spilling. If all
the load / store instructions would be folded then spilling is cheaper because
it won't require new live intervals / registers. See 2003-05-31-LongShifts for
an example.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
With a copying garbage collector, derived pointers must not be retained across
collector safe points; the collector could move the objects and invalidate the
derived pointer. This is bad enough in the first place, but safe points can
crop up unpredictably. Consider:
%array = load { i32, [0 x %obj] }** %array_addr
%nth_el = getelementptr { i32, [0 x %obj] }* %array, i32 0, i32 %n
%old = load %obj** %nth_el
%z = div i64 %x, %y
store %obj* %new, %obj** %nth_el
If the i64 division is lowered to a libcall, then a safe point will (must)
appear for the call site. If a collection occurs, %array and %nth_el no longer
point into the correct object.
The fix for this is to copy address calculations so that dependent pointers
are never live across safe point boundaries. But the loads cannot be copied
like this if there was an intervening store, so may be hard to get right.
Only a concurrent mutator can trigger a collection at the libcall safe point.
So single-threaded programs do not have this requirement, even with a copying
collector. Still, LLVM optimizations would probably undo a front-end's careful
work.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
The ocaml frametable structure supports liveness information. It would be good
to support it.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
The FIXME in ComputeCommonTailLength in BranchFolding.cpp needs to be
revisited. The check is there to work around a misuse of directives in inline
assembly.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
It would be good to detect collector/target compatibility instead of silently
doing the wrong thing.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
It would be really nice to be able to write patterns in .td files for copies,
which would eliminate a bunch of explicit predicates on them (e.g. no side
effects). Once this is in place, it would be even better to have tblgen
synthesize the various copy insertion/inspection methods in TargetInstrInfo.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
Stack coloring improvements:
1. Do proper LiveStackAnalysis on all stack objects including those which are
not spill slots.
2. Reorder objects to fill in gaps between objects.
e.g. 4, 1, <gap>, 4, 1, 1, 1, <gap>, 4 => 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 4
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
The scheduler should be able to sort nearby instructions by their address. For
example, in an expanded memset sequence it's not uncommon to see code like this:
movl $0, 4(%rdi)
movl $0, 8(%rdi)
movl $0, 12(%rdi)
movl $0, 0(%rdi)
Each of the stores is independent, and the scheduler is currently making an
arbitrary decision about the order.
//===---------------------------------------------------------------------===//
Another opportunitiy in this code is that the $0 could be moved to a register:
movl $0, 4(%rdi)
movl $0, 8(%rdi)
movl $0, 12(%rdi)
movl $0, 0(%rdi)
This would save substantial code size, especially for longer sequences like
this. It would be easy to have a rule telling isel to avoid matching MOV32mi
if the immediate has more than some fixed number of uses. It's more involved
to teach the register allocator how to do late folding to recover from
excessive register pressure.